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Italian Welfare in the Aftermath of the  
Economic Crisis: Neoliberal Reforms and  
Limits to the Path Dependency Approach
iJin Hong
Sungshin Women’s University
The 2008 world economic crisis provided a plausible rationale 
for policy makers in Italy to push forward long needed welfare 
cuts, resulting in the neoliberal austerity trend fostered by the 
Monti government (2011-2012). This paper seeks to understand 
the logic behind the welfare reforms in Italy after the 2008 eco-
nomic crisis by describing implemented measures and reviewing 
available theoretical approaches in literature that could account 
for the reforms’ neoliberal shift from a path-dependent theoretical 
approach. It is argued that external forces, that is the economic 
crisis and EU pressures, represented the main trigger, and that 
political elites marginalized the role played by civil society, with 
social problems, such as unemployment, worsening as a result.
Key words: Crisis, neoliberalism, welfare reform, Europeaniza-
tion, advocacy coalition framework
In 2008, a massive crisis hit the world economy: the finan-
cial system was collapsing, and the Lehman Brothers finan-
cial services company went bust, resulting in great hardships 
for the American banking system. The negative implications 
soon affected the European financial system, more vulner-
able to shocks in the absence of controlling institutions such as 
the American Federal Reserve (Eurispes, 2013). Suddenly, the 
weaknesses of the dominant economic paradigm of neoliberal-
ism and its laissez faire strategies of relegating increasing debt 
to private households and markets became obvious. 
Southern European countries were suffering the most from 
the financial market instability, caught between the unsustain-
able costs of their public social insurance systems and the EU 
requirement to keep their public debt levels under control. 
Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare, June 2014, Volume XLI, Number 2
73
Weak economies such as those in Italy, Greece, Spain and 
Portugal already had comparatively underdeveloped social 
protection systems for the vulnerable, and less than developed 
financial institutions. Moreover, neoliberal individualiza-
tion of social risks had already started by the time the crisis 
hit these markets (Guillen & Petmesidou, 2008; ISTAT, 2012; 
Pizzuti, 2009). Additionally, these countries were already no-
torious for the politicalization of their welfare systems, or in 
other words, political cronyism (clientelismo) (Ferrera, 1998; 
Girotti, 1998). The neoliberal strategy of shifting responsibili-
ties for social protection from the public sector to the private 
sphere of families and the market only resulted in worsened 
inequality when it came to adequately meeting Italians’ social 
needs. 
This study attempts to make sense of the consequences of 
the 2008 economic crisis in Italy. In particular, I attempt to un-
derstand the mechanisms that led this welfare state to adopt 
decidedly neoliberal social policy reforms: a puzzling strategy, 
when considering that continental European welfare states, in 
Southern Europe in particular, are commonly considered diffi-
cult to reform (Palier, 2010). What kinds of policy reforms were 
implemented? What were the most important factors that de-
termined such reforms? Which theories are helpful in gaining 
understanding of this neoliberal shift in welfare reform in 
Italy? What kind of lessons can be drawn from the post-crisis 
Italian welfare state reform experience from an international 
perspective? 
By reviewing previous research in political economy theory 
and policy analysis, this article provides insights into the social 
reforms implemented in Italy in the post 2008 economic crisis 
and the some of the key factors that could have caused the 
crisis. The aim is to provide a theoretical framework within 
which political bipartisanship, the influences of the economic 
crisis and the European Union, poor policy learning mecha-
nisms, and the reduced role of the civil society are all account-
ed for simultaneously (Crouch, 2008; Natali & Rhodes, 2004; 
Palier, 2010; Sabatier, 1988). 
The article is structured as follows. The second section 
provides an account of the 2008 global economic crisis, and 
the factors that could have caused it, with Italy as a primary 
example. While neoliberal ideology had already been 
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dominating past legislatures, this economic crisis, in particular, 
resulted in the rise of more decisive cuts in social expendi-
ture. The third part outlines the reforms that have been imple-
mented in Italy following the crisis. Some of the major reforms 
included rises in taxation and public expenditure, on the one 
hand, and more direct cuts in the areas of pensions, labor 
market, health, and social services, on the other. The fourth 
part of the study  attempts to assemble elements into a useful 
theoretical framework that can help readers to understand the 
logic behind the austerity-oriented neoliberal reforms adopted 
in Italy. 
Going past traditional theoretical approaches in political 
economy, which are based on path dependency approaches 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990; Hall & Soskice, 2001), I attempt to 
explain the impact that the recent economic crisis has had on 
social policy reform in Italy by highlighting pressures from 
the European Union, and the ensuing lack of policy learning 
processes and civil society participation. In doing so, I adopt 
Sabatier’s (1988) advocacy coalition framework (ACF) ap-
proach. The final section draws some policy implications for re-
forming welfare states. Understanding the necessity to involve 
different social actors in welfare reform serves as a reminder of 
the dangers that an excessive focus on self-referential discours-
es of policy elites, with consequent neglect of societal needs, 
can represent for the real economy: namely, increased levels of 
poverty, unemployment and inequality. 
Economic Crisis and Neoliberal Directions 
The 2008 global crisis involved the global financial market 
and uncontrolled flow of capital, therefore differentiating it 
from previous economic shocks. For instance, Keynesianism 
strategies were implemented to deal with previous crises: 
Governments directly intervened in the economy by fostering 
market demand, enacting protectionist measures, and utilizing 
industrial policy initiatives put forward by active labor unions. 
Governments were fostering aggregated demand via expan-
sionary macro policies and employment protection, a strategy 
that, in the long term, would yield negative consequences for 
inflation and public debt levels (Crouch, 2008; Pontusson & 
Raess, 2012). In contrast, the 2008 crisis hit a global economy 
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that was permeated by neoliberal thinking, according to which 
public institutions are perceived as an obstacle to the full 
functioning of markets (Pizzuti, 2012). In such a context, the 
strategy of demand management, typical of Keynesian gov-
ernments, was replaced by a new ‘privatized Keynesianism,’ 
according to which “new risk markets to ordinary consum-
ers, via extended mortgages and credit card debt, replace the 
previous capitalist system based on rising wages, welfare 
state and government-led demand management” (Crouch, 
2008, p. 10). In particular, the European Union economy has 
been heavily influenced by the German neoliberal model of 
capitalism, in which capital goods production and exports are 
considered more important than boosting domestic consumer 
demand. Priority is given to balanced public budgets and the 
avoidance of inflation (Cesaratto & Pivetti, 2012; Crouch, 2008; 
Pontusson & Raess, 2012). Despite this emphasis, Germany’s 
governmental debt was at 82 percent of its GDP, slightly less 
than the United Kingdom’s debt of 90 percent. 
Figure 1. Current Account Balance Trend in Italy (% of GDP)
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The assumptions inherent in neoliberal ideas (having 
access to perfect information, perfect competition, and the 
like) were de facto detrimental to Southern European coun-
tries not adequately equipped to directly compete with big 
export-led economies, such as Germany. In the absence of an 
alternative economic paradigm, as Figure 1 illustrates, Italy’s 
political elites, traditionally following a top-down policy 
making model, have been very keen in responding to exter-
nal pressures by the EU to redress the national public budget 
deficit.
Figure 1 displays public account balance trends in Italy 
since the 1970s. Apart from the oil crisis of 1973, the 2008 fi-
nancial shock represented the second worst period in terms 
of the deterioration of public finances. After recovering from 
the 1970s oil crisis, public spending went through a relatively 
stable phase that dramatically improved in the early 1990s, 
when Italian politics was struggling both to regain some cred-
ibility from the political bribery scandals (the “Clean Hands” 
police investigations) and to abide by the economic stability 
conditions dictated by the Maastricht treaty as a condition for 
access to the European Union. By the late 1990s, the opening of 
the European Central Bank (ECB) had been announced as well. 
Figure 2. GDP Growth and Household Final Consumption 
Expenditure (percent)
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However, since the end of the 1990s ( when full membership to 
the EU and participation to the monetary union were secured), 
account balances started worsening again under the Berlusconi 
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governments. In effect, the economic crisis of 2008 only wors-
ened an already quite dramatic situation, since Italian public 
debt was already abnormally high by that time. In order to 
keep the situation under control, and with the collaboration 
of the Italian President of the Republic, Giorgio Napolitano, 
Berlusconi was forced to resign and a new government of tech-
nocrats led by former European Commissioner Mario Monti 
was formed on a temporary basis (2011-2012) to take charge of 
the debt crisis in compliance with European directives. 
The Monti government took charge at a time when the 
Italian economy was already in a dire condition. Falling con-
sumption rates (see Figure 2), however, were not to be over-
turned by a socio-political strategy that was admittedly neo-
liberal and unsupportive of the real economy’s aggregated 
demand. I will now turn to a brief overview of the main social 
policies introduced during the global financial crisis.
Social Policy Reform Trends
The Italian Welfare State Structure
Traditionally, the Italian welfare state had a higher propor-
tion of expenditures dedicated to income protection measures, 
and most notably, to pensions (see Figure 3 for a comparison 
with selected European countries). When analyzing total social 
expenditure trends over the last 30 years, it appears that the 
immediate aftermath of the economic crisis caused a sudden 
increase in social expenditure levels, a trend that can be ob-
served for all Southern European countries (Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development, 2012). 
But how did this increase in expenditure reflect on the 
different policy fields? Expenditure trends divided by policy 
sector show that the prevalence of pensions and health ex-
penditures remained quite robust even in the post-crisis years 
(Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
2012), which seems to suggest that the overall structure of 
social expenditure in Italy remained substantially the same, 
similar to the findings of previous studies in other European 
countries (Chung & Thewissen, 2011; Vis, van Kersbergen, & 
Hylands, 2011). Also, rises in social expenditure levels mea-
sured as percentages of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) might 
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be biased when national revenues decrease in the face of eco-
nomic crises. 
Although overall expenditure levels might not have 
changed visibly in the years following the crisis, previous 
welfare institutions were not left unscathed. Instead, reforms 
from the Monti government were following a neoliberal logic 
of welfare cuts and individualization of social risk (Pizzuti, 
2009).
Figure 3. Composition of Social Protection Spending in Selected 
Bismarckian Countries* in 2009 (% of GDP)
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*Most continental European welfare states rely mainly on social insurance, a system 
first introduced by Otto von Bismarck in Germany in the 19th century. This is also a 
typical feature of the Italian welfare system, so that it commonly is compared with 
continental European welfare states.
Monti Government's Reforms (2011-2012)
Financial Market
The priority goal for the technocratic government of 2011-
2012 was to balance public finances. This was done mainly by 
increasing the level of taxation—increasing indirect taxes on 
consumption (Value Added Tax) and on alcoholic products, 
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reintroducing the local tax on housing (IMU), and also on re-
ducing the fiscal cost of hiring employees for firms (this cost 
was relatively high due to social contributions levied for pen-
sions and other social insurance systems) (Eurispes, 2013). It 
was also done by containing public sector costs by cutting 
budgetary expenses for public education and health, and by 
adopting a three-year freeze on salary increases, along with 
limits to new public sector hiring from 2010 (Maino & Neri, 
2011).
Pensions
As for pensions, the main intent of the Minister of Labor, 
Social Policies and Gender Equality, Elsa Fornero, was to 
speed up the privatization of the pension system conceived 
by the Amato and Dini reforms in the 1990s. These reforms 
basically fostered individualization of social risk with the in-
troduction of the Notional Defined Contribution system for 
calculating the final amount of pensions, and provided in-
centives for the creation of private sector pensions based on 
capitalization of funds (Hong, 2012). Pizzuti (2012) has argued 
that further cutting expenses on pensions in Italy was not jus-
tified by the high level of expenditure in pensions compared to 
other European countries; additionally, because private funds 
transfer the costs of the volatility of private finance to the final 
amount of pensions, beneficiaries pay the highest price due 
to the uncertainty of foreign financial markets. What makes it 
worse, NDC-based pensions are not adjusted for inflation, and 
beneficiaries bear additional costs of higher administrative ex-
penses and instability (Pizzuti, 2012).
Labor Market
Labor market reforms were met with high expectations, 
since they were meant to correct inequalities in the highly 
segmented Italian labor market, where the level of social pro-
tection largely depends on the type of employment contract. 
The Fornero reform was, however, not adequately addressing 
these issues: the apprenticeship contract had been introduced; 
rules for dismissal were modified (granting more discretion 
to judges); unemployment benefits were not broadened in 
coverage; and the maximum duration for ‘mobility’ benefits 
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(covering the time frame from dismissal to finding another oc-
cupation) was reduced. The piecemeal way these reforms were 
enacted classified them as “incomplete” reform in the eyes of 
some observers (Lavoce.info, 2012).
Health
Due to the reduction of public funds, the National Health 
System (SSN) (financed through general taxation) has suffered 
from budget cuts, leading to the reduction of the number of 
beds in hospitals. Coordinated facilities for primary care should 
have been set, but this depended on the successful renewal of 
national agreements with general practitioners as stipulated 
in the Balduzzi legislative decree, a legislative frame within 
which the appointment of new general directors in hospitals, 
new sanctions for illegal sale of tobacco, and opening hours for 
pharmacies, among other things, are regulated (Lavoce.info, 
2012).
Social Services
Social services and family policies were possibly the areas 
that suffered the most as a consequence of the post-crisis 
reforms. While funds for social assistance, child care, and long 
term care are financed through regional budgets, the 2011 
Budget Law caused a serious blow to the amount of public 
funds allocated to the regions, which in some cases, were cur-
tailed almost completely. Decentralization of powers to local 
governments with no adequate financial coverage from the 
central governments illustrated the neglect of social services in 
a moment when Italian families needed them the most (Maino 
& Neri, 2011).
In a nutshell, from a social policy perspective, neoliberal 
strategies of cost containment and increased fiscal pressures on 
Italian families were not adequately balanced by income and 
social needs. As a result, overall social vulnerability worsened, 
with soaring unemployment levels and rising intergeneration-
al, gender, and territorial inequalities, thus contributing to an 
already difficult social mobility in Italy. As Figure 4 illustrates, 
unemployment rates have been rising dramatically since the 
crisis, and dual labor market inequalities seem to have become 
a more important issue than the gender gap.
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In Search of a Theoretical Framework 
Classical Social Policy Theories
Italy’s social protection and capitalistic production systems 
have long coexisted under the logic of social insurance and 
life-long employment for male breadwinners. Following a 
traditional perspective on social risks, viewed as the loss of 
income in critical life situations (for example, illness, old age, 
invalidity), the Italian welfare state developed incrementally 
by letting the social protection system grow, with social con-
tribution requirements increasing during the thirty years after 
the end of the war. Those were the years of public expenditure 
expansion, when concerted negotiations between government, 
employers, and employees were determining the real level of 
wage of industrial workers, and social expenditure growth 
was beneficial to all. More specifically, it was particularly ben-
eficial to the Democratic Christian Party (DC), a dominant po-
litical party in those years, that was willing to gather politi-
cal consensus in exchange for a substantial lack of democratic 
competition.
Figure 4. Unemployment Rate 1992-2012, per Gender and Age (%)
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This essentially static political economy system has been 
variously interpreted in terms of being a coordinated market 
economy (CME), a Bismarckian corporatist-conservative 
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welfare state, and a Southern European type of welfare state 
with its own characteristics, such as a high level of political 
clientelism, low levels of social expenditure, low levels of re-
distribution, a focus on income protection rather than on direct 
social services, and a strong degree of institutional stickiness 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990; Ferrera, 1996; Hall & Soskice, 2001; 
Kammer, Niehues, & Peichl, 2012; Palier, 2010; Raitano, 2012; 
Schroeder, 2008). However, these approaches tend to be prob-
lematic in terms of understanding policy change. Previously, 
I argued that the economic crisis has seemingly triggered a 
series of neoliberal responses. Is it correct, then, to assume 
that the crisis alone caused welfare cuts? What was the role of 
workers and civil society in this respect? Why did policy learn-
ing mechanisms not allow social policies to be more respon-
sive to the economy’s real needs? Since welfare state classifi-
cation theories are better suited to provide path-dependency 
oriented interpretations, here I am attempting to explore some 
more flexible theoretical frameworks to gain an understand-
ing of the dynamics behind the neoliberal turn in the Italian 
welfare state.
Understanding Policy Change
The reform window’s approach. The Bismarckian welfare 
systems of continental Europe are commonly understood as 
being structured in a way that is difficult to reform, so that 
even when changes are made, they hardly represent a radical 
change in their welfare state structure (Hinrichs, 2000; Palier 
2010). Italy has been no exception to that, as mentioned 
earlier. However, this does not necessarily mean that changes 
in welfare are trivial and path dependency theories do not 
apply. Faced with the task of understanding the nature of such 
changes, Natali & Rhodes (2004) suggested that the space-
opportunity for reforms would be the result of two opposing 
forces, internal and external. Internally, industrial relations 
and institutional inertia/stickiness tend to keep the system 
as it is. Externally, neoliberal dictates of competitiveness and 
financial sustainability, the Europeanization process, and the 
need to respond to societal problems, tend to push in the direc-
tion of change (Natali & Rhodes, 2004).
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Figure 5. The reform window’s approach for Bismarckian countries
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The policy arena approach. The policy arena approach is com-
monly used to understand, through an ideal situation model, 
what happens inside the policy decision-making process once 
a social issue has successfully entered the political agenda. 
A typical diagram presents a vertical structure with arrows 
progressing through subsequent stages, from top to bottom. 
The policy making path would start with a public policy crisis 
marked by the clash between ‘old’ and ‘new’ problems (first 
stage), which would then result in the civil and political actors’ 
mobilization and the creation of coalitions and institutional 
projects (stage two). Eventually, these conflicting plans and co-
alitions would compete in the political arena (stage three), and 
ultimately, the result of such conflicts would be the generation 
of reform outputs (stage four) (Ferrera, 1993). 
Girotti (1998) imagined a more static model for describing 
the development of the modern welfare state that would re-
semble a balance between actors in the public administration, 
the economic system, the civil society, and the government. 
But ultimately it was the political elites that made final policy 
decisions in the politics arena, by putting together possible 
solutions presented from both political institutions (public 
administration and government) and the socio-economic 
system (civil society and the economic system). Unfortunately, 
these ideal-typical schemes do not help us account for policy 
change/reform.
An alternative approach. Natali & Rhodes (2004) are correct in 
stressing the importance of external forces determining policy 
change; however, they are not very specific on the modalities 
the political struggle would follow. Also, why were real needs 
of society left unattended in the Italian case? The main limit of 
the above theories is evidenced by the simplicity with which 
political competition among different coalitions is imagined. 
Power balances and the way in which they communicate are, 
in fact, much more complicated, and external pressures are 
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not taken into account within the interpretive frames of the 
policy arena. Why, for example, were trade unions and social 
movements not successful in influencing political agendas like 
in the past? What happened to policy learning processes? In 
the Italian case, it looks as if the political arena was too elitist 
and narrowly self-referential to respond to the real needs of 
the society, whereas it was more easily affected by the external 
influence of the economic crisis and pressures from the EU. 
In searching for an interpretive model that could properly 
account for such external pressures and the real economy, I 
chose to apply Sabatier (1988)’s Advocacy Coalition Framework 
(ACF) to the analysis of the Italian post-crisis welfare reforms. 
While this model has its roots in public policy theory1, its com-
plexity serves to grasp the dynamics laying behind neoliberal-
ism in the Italian form, since it stresses the role of advocacy 
coalitions that can successfully influence the policy agenda. 
In Sabatier’s (1988) view, the policy arena (“policy subsys-
tem”) is but one of the areas through which policy outcomes 
see the light of the day. Other important aspects that give rise 
to policy reform processes are the real world and its prob-
lems, resources, values, and rules (“relatively stable param-
eters”). “External system events” are represented by external 
socio-economic and political changes. Summarizing, external 
systems and stable parameters influence the policy arena by 
defining needs and tasks that the government needs to take 
up. However, such influences are not easily injected into the 
political agenda, since they also have to be efficiently orga-
nized at a societal level ( e.g., trade unions, social movements) 
and the constraints and limited resources of subsystem actors 
(Sabatier, 1988) have to be accounted for. An overview of the 
ACF theory can be seen in Figure 6.
When applied to the case of Italy, the ACF diagram could 
be reinterpreted in the form presented in Figure 7. In the 
figure, arrows connecting one area to another in thicker black 
whenever these links are stronger, and in lighter black when-
ever they tend to be fainter. External system events (box no. 
1) are, in this case, represented by the concurrent demands of 
the economic crisis and the EU pressures for fiscal austerity. 
The policy subsystem area (box no. 2) is depicted as the policy 
decision making process, and the real economy’s relatively 
stable parameters can be seen in box no. 3. The most peculiar 
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characteristic for the Italian case consists in the fact that, due 
to political opportunist strategies of clientelism and big coali-
tions of governments led by the DC party, democratic competi-
tion tended to be restricted. In this light, policy discourses, ex-
pectations, paradigms, were not really produced as a result of 
democratic competition in the policy arena; the preponderance 
of the DC party led instead to a set of cognitive assumption 
that were already given for granted. As a result, final decisions 
and policy outputs were quite self-referential, bearing little 
connection with the real society. In a word, the cognitive activ-
ity of policy elites was trapped in a paternalistic, top-down ap-
proach to policy making, with discussion among social parts 
left to a minimum and weak policy learning mechanisms. 
Figure 6. General Model of Policy Change Focusing on Competing 
Advocacy Coalitions within Policy Subsystems.
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Source: Sabatier (1988, p. 132) (revised).
Given this conservative political landscape, it was chal-
lenging for society’s real needs (box no. 3) to gain access to the 
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political agenda, due, in part, to a low capacity of organiza-
tion from Italian trade unions and civil society organizations, 
and possibly also due to the indiscriminate pro-government 
use of television and media that delivered distorted images of 
societal issues and governmental actions, especially during the 
years of Berlusconi’s legislature. 
Figure 7. Applying the ACF Model to Social Policy Reform in Italy.)
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Source: Re-configured from Sabatier (1988).
On the other hand, the economic crisis and EU pressures 
for austerity (box no. 1) were providing a good rationale for 
neoliberal political forces to continue to fail to substantively 
reform the welfare system in a way that could seriously reflect 
societal needs. This created a vicious circle in which EU pres-
sures and the economic crisis were pushing towards auster-
ity reforms. This resulted in increasing fiscal pressure and cuts 
in welfare services for Italian households; as a consequence, 
available resources, represented by tax revenues, were shrink-
ing. Ultimately, such a vicious circle helped push the country to 
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the verge of economic recession (Eurispes, 2013). Although the 
Monti government first, and the incumbent Letta government 
afterwards, repeatedly assured people that the Italian economy 
was recovering, this risk has yet to be averted. If the govern-
ment and the industry continued to only care about keeping 
financial markets afloat by financial bailouts (in the absence 
of compensating support to the economic demand of middle 
and low-income families), a way out of the vicious circle was 
difficult to imagine. In the absence of a strategy that does not 
contemplate participation from the economy’s civil coalitions, 
relying on politically elitist decision making is going to widen 
the gap between the rationale of electoral competition and the 
need to structurally reform the Italian welfare system. Monti 
government’s reforms, in this sense, demonstrated the limits 
of a neoliberal strategy that had proven to be substantially in-
capable of pushing the country out of the crisis, the effects of 
which continue unabated to this day.
Conclusions and Policy Implications
This study sought to provide a theoretical lens to explore 
social policy reforms enacted in Italy after the 2008 world 
economic crisis. Special attention has been paid to the 2011-
2012 Monti government, specifically to its neoliberal strat-
egy of prioritizing austerity measures that, to a large extent, 
failed to change the structure of the segmented labor market 
in Italy and to reduce hardships of impoverished Italian fami-
lies through better social services. Instead, tax increases and 
the privatization of social protection and the retrenchment 
of regional funds dedicated to social services, education, and 
health, contributed to further aggravating Italy’s economy. By 
applying Sabatier’s (1988) ACF theoretical approach to the dy-
namics of Italian welfare reform, it has been argued that ex-
ternal pressures from the economic crisis and the European 
Union’s demands for balanced public accounts, coupled with 
Italy’s traditionally elitist decision making, systematically pre-
vented the forces in civil society from positively contributing 
to the policy change process. In the absence of adequate dem-
ocratic competition, the only available economic paradigm 
was neoliberalism, which included the policy choice of a pu-
nitive laissez-faire strategy of individualization of social risks 
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(Pizzuti, 2009). At this stage, it is still not possible to rule out 
the possibility that Italy will fall into a similar economic reces-
sion as Greece (Eurispes, 2013). 
This analysis of the policy decision making process in 
Italy can have useful political implications for social-insur-
ance based welfare states also in need of reform. It appears 
that leaving the assessment of social needs and the choice of 
viable policy strategies to only electoral competition tends to 
exacerbate policy inefficiencies, especially for those policy sub-
systems with high levels of political cronyism. To put it dif-
ferently, the decision making process is essentially flawed by 
the need to be politically more attractive to the masses, which 
can lead to a lack of efficiency in the use of public resources, 
a blurred perception of the main social priorities that have to 
be tackled by national social policies, and vulnerability to the 
economic requirements dictated by the world’s economy and 
financial institutions. An active involvement of trade unions 
and civil society, a more transparent media system, and more 
democratic competition in the political arena are indispensable 
to help the whole policy mechanism work smoothly (Sabatier, 
1988). It is particularly important for welfare states that resem-
ble the Bismarckian model, such as continental European and 
East Asian countries (Holliday, 2000), to not fall into a vicious 
post-crisis neoliberal cycle, in which the external economy’s 
pressures and political elites’ self-referential thinking strongly 
enforce each other in neglecting real society’s needs.
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Endnotes: 
1 Although the “advocacy coalition framework” is originally 
conceived as an extension of Heclo’s 1974 work, “Social Policy in 
Britain and Sweden,” Sabatier’s (1988) scope is much broader. By 
including all public policies at large, the examples that he sets forth 
are mainly about environmental policies.
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